Functional Inconsistencies: State Inspection of Agricultural Labour in Switzerland

Author(s) : Simon Affolter

Source : https://doi.org/10.1515/9783839451045-006

Abstract:

It is an ironic truism of our time that a bureaucratic apparatus often pro-duces effects that conflict with bureaucratic goals. Such “unintended outcomes” result from complex governmental procedures that can create momentum and lead to developments that deviate from the original intent. While acknowledging the endless red tape that bureaucracies seem to generate, I aim to show analytically that it is misleading to define contra-indicated results of official practice as “unanticipated consequences” (Merton 1936; Merton 1968) or “unintended outcomes” (Foucault 1991) in reference to offi-cial government goals. As De Genova appropriately stresses, this interpretation expresses “‘good faith’ toward the state, and its underlying belief in the law’s transparency [and] does not allow for the possibility that the law may have been instrumental in generating parameters” (2002: 432). Or, as Frank De Zwart points out: “social scientists, eager to speak truth to power, should consider the possibility that those in power may know the truth, yet let bad things happen anyway because they fear worse” (2015: 295).